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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, policymakers, both in the
United States and abroad, are attempting to modify current laws to hedge
against the risk of another devastating financial recession. In 2008, the G20
committed to strengthening sound regulation, promoting integrity in the
marketplace, encouraging international cooperation, and reforming
international financial institutions.' Among these reforms, the G20 focused
specifically on the role derivatives played on the financial crisis. 2
Many G20 member countries responded to this commitment by enacting
laws and regulations to fulfill these goals. The United States made
regulatory changes to the derivative markets in the form of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010.3 In the Dodd-
Frank reforms, U.S. legislators focused on making changes to the derivatives
markets in furtherance of the G20's commitment by implementing reporting
requirements for derivatives.4  Dodd-Frank gave the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) power over these derivatives instruments.s This included
both exchange-traded derivatives and over-the-counter (OTC derivatives)
derivatives.6 Financial regulators in the European Union also focused their
attention heavily on derivatives.7 One of their most important changes came
through the European Market Infrastructure Reform (EMIR), which was
largely focused on OTC derivatives.8 The EMIR placed the European
Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) in charge of making rules for the
1 Group of Twenty, Group of Twenty-Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and
the World Economy November 15-16, 2008, Washington DC, Group of Twenty, 48 I.L.M.
416, 417-18 (2009). See generally G20, http://www.g20.org/English (discussing the initiation
and role of the G20).
2 Group of Twenty, supra note 1, at 420.
7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13)(G) (2010) ("Each swap (whether cleared or uncleared) shall be
reported to a registered swap data repository."). See also Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, FIRST DATA (Aug. 2010), https://c.ymcdn.com/
sites/www.napcp.org/resource/resmgr/Resource_Center/FirstData Summaryof WallSt.pdf
(summarizing the Dodd-Frank Act and its efforts to eliminate many loopholes found in
financial regulation, including those for over-the-counter derivatives, asset-backed securities,
hedge funds, mortgage bankers, and payday lenders).
4 See FIRST DATA, supra note 3.
5 Derivatives, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, May 4, 2015, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml.
6 Id.
Commission Regulation 2015/1515, 2015 O.J. (L 239) 63 (EU).
8 Id.; see also Overview, SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. Ass'N, http://www.sifina.org/issues/
regulatory-reform/otc-derivatives/overview/ (explaining that OTC derivatives are those that
are not traded on an exchange and that they are privately made contracts, which were largely
unregulated prior to the 2008 financial crisis).
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trade repositories in the European Union. 9 Like U.S. agencies, such as the
SEC and the CFTC, ESMA has implemented and currently enforces data
requirements for reporting OTC derivatives to trade repositories.10 Other
countries, like Australia and Japan, have also implemented their own OTC
derivatives reporting regimes with the similar goal of increased
transparency.1 '
These regulators believe that their reporting requirements promote
transparency, which was highly necessary after the 2008 financial crisis.
However, some countries have not reformed their regulatory schemes to
require that OTC derivatives be reported to trade repositories. 12  Such
locations may become a safe haven for financial institutions to take
advantage of less-onerous regulations. This is known as regulatory
arbitrage.1 3  Financial institutions might seek to move their derivative
practices to these jurisdictions because their lax regulations may increase
profit margins. 14
While it is uncertain how many jurisdictions will attempt to legislatively
correct the systemic flaws that caused the financial crisis, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the Committee of
Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) have sought to create a
uniform tagging system in furtherance of the G20's commitment to fostering
9 Improving the Functioning of the OTC Derivatives Markets in the European Union,
DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORP. (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Dow
loads/Data-and-Repository-Services/GTR/GTR-Europe/Summary_ESMATechnicalStandard
s.pdf.
10 OTC Derivatives and Clearing Obligations, ESMA, https://www.esma.europa.eu/regula
tion/post-trading/otc-derivatives-and-clearing-obligation (last visited Dec. 16, 2015).
1" Derivatives Transaction Reporting, AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INV. COMM'N, Mar. 23, 2016,
http://aasic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/markets/otc-derivatives-reform/derivative-transaction-
reporting/; Masamichi Kono, OTC Derivatives Reforms, FIN. SERv. AGENCY OF JAPAN (Sept.
23, 2015), http://www.fsa.go.jp/common/conference/danw a/20150923/01.pdf (stating that
Japan has law in place for derivative trade reporting to repositories along with other countries
such as: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and
Singapore).
12 See, e.g., OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, 1, 12 (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.fnancialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141107.pdf (finding that as of
fall 2014 the only two countries that had not implemented a trade repository scheme for OTC
derivatives were Turkey and Argentina); South Africa: Financial Sector Assessment Program
Reforms in the OTC Derivatives Market, INT'L MONETARY FUND 1, 5 (Feb. 2015), https://
www.imforg/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/crl 552.pdf.
13 Christian Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, and Dodd-Frank:
The Implications of US Global OTC Derivative Regulation, 14 NEV. L.J. 542, 542-43 (2014)
(defining regulatory arbitrage as trying to buy OTC derivative contracts in less-regulated
jurisdictions in order to take on higher levels of risk, cheaper prices, or both).
14 Cf id. at 544-45 (discussing the outcome ofU.S. derivative regulation and the isolationism
effect it will have on U.S. institutions participating in the OTC derivatives market).
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transparency between its member jurisdictions.15 On August 19, 2015, the
IOSCO and the CPMI announced a plan to implement Unique Transaction
Identifiers attached to derivatives contracts sold in all 115 of its member
jurisdictions.1 6 These Unique Transaction Identifiers are meant to help
member countries identify OTC derivatives transactions by mandating that
members report the data to trade repositories. 17 The goal of such a program
is to allow more transparency in the financial marketplace through means
that better control and monitor the markets. This allows regulators in
member jurisdictions to make more informed decisions as they attempt to
hedge against the risk of another financial meltdown.' 8
It is uncertain how the Unique Transaction Identifier scheme will affect
the financial marketplace. The effects should be analyzed based on how the
IOSCO's tagging system will influence both member and non-member
jurisdictions. Some of the positive effects could include: (1) better
transparency in member jurisdictions, and (2) more oversight over the OTC
markets by member-country regulators, which would allow for better global
risk management.' 9
However, it is possible that the implementation of this system will allow
financial institutions in member and non-member jurisdictions to take
advantage of countries with stiffer regulatory schemes because of the
transparency supplied through the Unique Transaction Identifier's structure.
Also, financial institutions may find moving to jurisdictions with lesser
regulation more lucrative, as moving may allow them to take advantage of
increased arbitrage opportunities.20 If this becomes common practice, it will
lead to poorer global financial policy and increase the likelihood of systemic
problems worldwide.
In order to fully understand how the Unique Transaction Identifiers will
affect current OTC derivatives markets, it is helpful to review two examples.
The first example (Illustration 1) is an OTC forward-based contract based on
'5 Cf Group of Twenty, Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World
Economy, 48 I.L.M. 416, 419 (2009).
1 Huw Jones, Global Tagging System Proposed for Derivatives Trades, REUTERS (Aug. 19,
2015, 10:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/19/g20-derivatives-regulations-idU
SL5N10U33E20150819; INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, Fact Sheet, 2 (2016), https://www.ios
co.org/about/pdf/IOSCO-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
7 Id.
18 See id.
19 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, Harmonisation of the
Unique Transaction Identifier 1 (Aug. 2015), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOS
COPD500.pdf.
20 Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global
Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REv. 1291, 1293 (2014) (noting the concern
that imposing harsh regulations in the U.S. might cause financial institutions to shift their
OTC derivatives operations to other, less-restrictive jurisdictions).
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a currently used Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago contract.2 1 This forward
contract would be regulated by the CFTC because the underlying asset is a
commodity.22
Manufacturer A-a U.S. company--enters into an agreement with Copper
Mining Company B-an Australian company-for 1,000 metric tons of
copper at a forward price of $6,000 per metric ton. This means that
Manufacturer A will get the 1,000 metric tons of copper at $6,000 per metric
ton regardless of the price at the date the deal is executed. At the set date
agreed on by the parties to execute the agreement, the market price of copper
per metric ton is $6,500. Manufacturer A will pay $6.5 million to Company
B, who simultaneously pays Manufacturer A $500,000. In effect,
Manufacturer A will receive $6.5 million worth of copper for only $6
million. However, if the market price at the execution date is $5,200 per
metric ton, Manufacturer A must pay Company B $5.2 million plus an
additional $800,000 because of the $6 million forward contract.2 3
The second example (Illustration 2) is an interest rate swap of a mortgage
backed security and is based on an example from the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association.2 4 Since this example is based on an underlying
security, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would have
25jurisdiction to regulate this OTC derivative contract.
Parties Alfa Corporation and Strong Financial enter into an agreement to
swap interest rates. Alfa Corporation agrees to pay 5.0% of $100 million on
a semiannual basis for the next five years based on the interest rate it
receives on farming supplies loaned to another farmer.26 In return, Strong
Financial agrees to pay the 3-Month London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR) rate on the $100 million on a quarterly basis for the same five-year
period based on an underlying mortgage-backed security asset it holds.2 7 In
this agreement, Alfa is agreeing to take on the risk from the variable LIBOR
interest rate. In return for the variability, Strong receives a fixed payment
21 RICHARD HECKINGER, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, UNDERSTANDING
DERIVATIVES: MARKETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE-DERIVATIVES OVERVIEW 5-7 (Aug. 2013),
https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/understanding-derivatives-chapterl -derivative
s-overview-pdfpdf~la=en.
22 Mission & Responsibilities, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, Dec. 18, 2015, http://
www.cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm.
23 HECKINGER, supra note 21, at 5-6.
24 Interest Rate Swap Example, INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Ass'N (2004), http://www.
isda.org/educat/pdf/IRS-Diagraml.pdf.
25 Derivatives, supra note 5 (noting that SEC has jurisdiction when the derivative is based
on an underlying security interest).
26 INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Ass'N, supra note 24 (meaning ALFA they will be
paying $2.5 million every six months-$100 million * (5.0%1/2)).
Id. (obligating Strong to pay Alfa $600,000 quarterly three-month LIBOR is 0.6% ($100
million * 0.6%)).
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amount. The rationale is based on who best can bear the risk of variability-
in this case it is Alfa. 28
The examples set forth above will serve as a basis to explain how Unique
Transaction Identifiers will affect OTC derivatives and what risk may be
associated with member and non-member jurisdictions arbitrage.
This Note will advocate that, even with the increased risk of financial
arbitrage, the Unique Transaction Identifier scheme will allow for more
market transparency. Further, the scheme will better hedge against the risk
of systemic failure in the OTC derivatives markets than inaction. First, this
Note will explain the fundamentals of OTC derivatives and the importance of
oversight of these financial vehicles, much of which will be viewed through
the lens of the financial crisis. Second, this Note will explore what Unique
Transaction Identifiers are and the practical application of such a system.
Third, this Note will detail the advantages and disadvantages of the tagging
system by weighing the risk of financial arbitrage against the benefits of
market transparency. Finally, the Note will discuss the risk of arbitrage by
both non-member and member jurisdictions and will ultimately conclude that
the benefits of transparency and information sharing outweigh the costs of
regulatory arbitrage.
II. FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES CRASH COURSE
A. Derivatives: Form and Function
Financial derivatives are instruments or contracts "whose value depends
on the values of one or more underlying assets or indexes of asset values." 29
Derivatives allow traders and institutions to leverage risk to pursue reward
based on future price movement. 30 These risky behaviors are justified
through hedging opportunities, which allow the investor to lock in a
maximum loss to protect against large downside swings.31 However,
28 Cf id. (amending the example given in the text).
29 Johnson, supra note 13, at 547.
30 Id.; THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
("They are not used for capital formation or investment, as are securities; rather, they are
instruments for hedging business risk or for speculating on changes in prices, interest rates,
and the like.") [hereinafter FIN. INQUIRY COMM'N].
3 See generally Keith Sill, The Economic Benefits and Risks of Derivative Securities, 18-
19 (Jan./Feb. 1997), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-
review/1997/January-february/brjf97ks.pdf; Viral Acharya et al., Chapter 10* Derivatives-
The Ultimate Financial Innovation, 1-2, http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/-mbrenner/research/deriv
atives.pdf.
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because derivatives are speculative by nature, they are also very risky when
not used in their intended hedging role.
There are two main types of derivatives: (1) exchange-traded derivatives,
and (2) OTC derivatives. 32  Exchange-traded derivatives are contracts,
standard in both form and function that pass through stock exchanges.33
Because these derivatives are traded through an exchange, they typically pass
the regulations placed on them by an exchange (an example would be the
NASDAQ) and therefore typically have some form of regulatory oversight.3 4
Exchange-traded derivatives are the more commonly discussed financial
derivative instrument. They are the standard options, futures, and swaps that
can be purchased on any trading account through an exchange. 3 5
Exchange-traded derivatives are typically cleared through a central
clearing party, which helps establish price transparency and more accurate
pricing.3 A Central Clearing Party (CCP or clearing house) is used to
standardize the transaction and act as the middleman in a derivatives
contracts. The two parties deal with the CCP rather than directly with the
other party.38 Additionally, CCPs are used to enforce regulations and
document transactions.39 Without documentation, derivatives contracts are
hard to track and even harder to litigate if a party retracts on the agreement.
On the other hand, OTC derivatives contracts are more fluid instruments
than exchange-traded derivatives. They are typically customized and made
with specific characteristics the parties deem necessary to achieve their
intended function. 40  Because OTC derivatives are made through private
dealings, these contracts are often not documented. "Before the Financial
Crisis, there was no price discovery mechanism for these financial
instruments, nor were they cleared through CCPs."4A Examples of OTC
derivative contracts include interest rate swaps, collateralized debt
32 Griffith, supra note 20, at 1297.
33 id
34 id.
3s Kathryn Collard, Advantages of a Co-Regulatory OTC Derivatives Scheme, 46 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 877, 881 (2015).
36 Id.
3 Id.
38 id.
39 id.
40 Definition of over-the-counter OTC, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term-over-t
he counter-OTC (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
a Collard, supra note 35, at 882 (arguing that these two characteristics were key to the
creating a financial system with systemic failure that ultimately led to the Financial Crisis).
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obligations, unregulated futures contracts, forward contracts, and credit
default swaps.4 2  43
Until recently, OTC derivatives were very lightly regulated.
Consequently, many times they went unreported." This transparency issue
in the OTC derivative marketplace was exacerbated when legislators, in an
attempt to require reporting, created competing and nonconforming
frameworks.45 By creating competing frameworks, the jurisdictions
effectuated conflict of law scenarios when the parties to the contract are from
two different jurisdictions. Institutions and jurisdictions are then faced with
the choice of deciding which jurisdiction's law applies. In 2010, Dodd-
Frank sought to fix these issues by giving the SEC and the CFTC control
over many of these financial vehicles trading within the United States and
over contracts when one party is a U.S. entity.46
B. A History of OTC Derivatives
OTC derivatives became very popular in the 1980s and have experienced
explosive growth since then. However, many do not know that derivatives
contracts have been used since around 2000 B.C. in ancient Mesopotamia.4
Since their inception, merchants and producers have used derivative
contracts to sell goods at a fixed future price. They have historically been
used by government entities to buy goods and products to conduct war.4 9 As
of 1994, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency made a list of about
1,200 different types of derivative contracts.50 These derivatives remained
largely unregulated until Dodd Frank's reforms.5 ' In the late 1980s and
42 See Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-The-Counter
Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1299-1300 (2010) (discussing the breakdown of
OTC derivatives in the market).
43 Id. (legislating with light regulations was likely due to the profitability of OTC
derivatives).
4 Griffith, supra note 20, at 1298, 1321-23 (stating that only the European Union, Japan
and the United States have adopted regulatory structures for OTC derivatives).
45 id.
46 See Johnson, supra note 13, at 543 (noting that Dodd-Frank gave the CFTC and SEC
extraterritorial jurisdiction to regulate specific forms of OTC derivatives outside of the United
States).
47 Id. at 550 (utilizing a study done by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to
indicate that at the end of 2012, there were $633 trillion worth of notional outstanding or
concluded OTC derivative contracts globally).
48 Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New Financial Bingo": A Risk-Based Approach
to Understanding Derivatives, 23 Iowa J. CORP. L. 1, 8 (1997).
49 See id at 8-9.
'
0 Id. at 9.
51 See generally 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2015) (Dodd-Frank's initial regulation of OTC
derivatives).
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throughout the 1990s, the CFTC granted more exemptions to derivatives
traded off of exchanges, leaving many items unregulated.5 2 These over-the-
counter derivatives created much of the financial bull market in the 1990s
and early 2000s.53 To continue the trend, and the booming bull market,
President Clinton signed into law the Commodities Futures Modernization
Act of 2000 (CFMA) which excluded many items from exchanges and other
forms of regulation.54 As of 2007, the OTC derivatives market consisted of
over $400 trillion worldwide.
Because of the financial crisis in 2008, Dodd-Frank's reforms directly
targeted derivatives. Under 7 U.S.C.A. § 2, the CFTC is granted "exclusive
jurisdiction" over derivatives unless otherwise stated by the Wall Street
Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010.56 This same act also gave the
SEC power over the derivatives markets when the derivative is of a financial
security.57 Since the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC and
SEC have increased oversight over the derivatives markets by implementing
58reporting requirements. Other countries have followed the United States'
lead, which has increased transparency.
52 Futures Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546 (1992); Policy Statements
Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30694-01 (July, 21 1989); Exemptions for
Certain Swap Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. 5587-01 (Jan. 22, 1993); Lucy McKinstry,
Regulating a Global Market: The Extraterritorial Challenge of Dodd-Frank's Margin
Requirements for Uncleared OTC Derivatives & a Mutual Recognition Solution, 51 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 776, 791-92 (2013) (summarizing the Federal Rules and Regulations set forth
above).
53 See THOMAS HELBLING ET AL., RIDING A WAVE, FIN. AND DEV. 11 (Mar. 2008), https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/03/pdf/helbling.pdf (this time period is also known
as the 2000s Commodities Boom).
54 Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Appendix E
(2000), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ554/pdf/PLAW-106publ554.pdf.
5s Collard, supra note 35, at 882.
56 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2015) (this code section has been revised many times to include
changes made, especially those made after the Dodd-Frank Act and financial reforms in
2010); Thomas A. Russo, The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 57 (1977) (the CFTC has had exclusive jurisdictions since
1974 and made decisions to minimize regulation throughout much of the 1990s and early
2000s).
5 7 U.S.C.A. § 2.
58 Registration of Security-based swap date repository, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13n-1 (2015); Swap
Data Repositories, 17 C.F.R. § 49 (2011).
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C. The Role of OTC Derivatives in the 2008 Financial Crisis
The 2008 financial crisis has been deemed by many to be the worst
economic downturn since the Great Depression.59 The Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas said in a study that the United States lost an estimated $6-$14
trillion as a result of the economic downturn. That estimate leaves every
U.S. household losing, on average, somewhere between $50,000 and
$120,000.60 In a study done by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics,
unemployment peaked in fall of 2009 at approximately 10%, a relatively
high number when compared with an unemployment rate of 5% in December
2007, before the recession.6 1 The United States was not the only country hit
hard by the economic downturn. The United Nations conducted a study that
approximated around 205 million people had no job at the end of 2009, and
though global unemployment was only 6.2%, the majority of higher-income
countries had rates similar to the United States.62
Though not the sole cause, the 2008 financial crisis was substantially
affected by OTC derivatives. 63 After the crisis, OTC derivatives came into
the limelight due to their unregulated status. The main criticism of OTC
derivatives is that they have "uncontrolled leverage; lack transparency,
capital, and collateral requirements; speculation; interconnections among
firms; and concentrations of risk. . . ."6 The "Bulge-Bracket" banks sell the
vast majority of OTC derivatives, accounting for 95% of derivatives, 90% of
which were over-the-counter.65
OTC derivatives were particularly risky at the time of the recession
because of their association with the volatile real estate market due to
"subprime lending." The innovation of Credit Default Swap (CDS) was
5 David Luttrell et al., Assessing the Costs and Consequences of the 2007-2009 Financial
Crisis and Its Aftermath, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Sept. 2013), http://www.dallasfed.
or gresearch/eclett/2013/ell307.cfm.
Id.61 Bureau of Labor and Statistics, The Recession of 2007-2009 (Feb. 2012), http://www.
bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recessionbls spotlight.pdf.
62 U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE GLOBAL SOCIAL CRisIS: REPORT ON THE
WORLD SOCIAL SITUATION 2011, at 28-29, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/334, U.N. Sales No.
E.10.IV.12 (2011), http://www.un.org/esalsocdev/rwss/docs/2011/chapter2.pdf.
63 Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. Bus.
L. REv. 1 (2011) (citing the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's study that the CFMA,
which legalized OTC derivative trading based on speculation, substantially contributed to the
financial crisis).
6 FIN. INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 30, at xxiv.
65 Baker, supra note 42, at 1302 (explaining "bulge bracket" included banks such as Merrill
Lynch, Bear Steams, UBS, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan,
Morgan Stanley, and Credit Suisse).
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created as a response to the securitization of mortgages.6 CDSs were swaps
meant to trade the debt associated with a real estate mortgage. Here, the
mortgage lender would pass the risk of the loan on to a buyer of the CDS.
CDSs caused lenders to be more lenient in their lending practices because
they incentivized lenders to give mortgages to people who might not have
previously been eligible for the loan due to bad credit, low income, or little
collateral.67 These lending practices were rightly, and infamously, known as
"subprime lending" because lenders made mortgage loans to borrowers who
were not financially sound or creditworthy at interest rates higher than others
who met the requisite criteria.68 CDSs, built upon the unstable real estate
market, were bought up by financial institutions and grouped together in
instruments known as Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO).69 CDOs were
also sold globally based on the expected future collective performance of the
mortgages contained within them. 70 Because CDOs raised the credit rating
of the individual credit default swaps, financial institutions could purchase
them on a wider scale because of their "diversified" quality. Some of these
purchasing institutions included Bear Steams, Merrill Lynch, AIG, and even
cities such as Birmingham, Alabama.71
However, despite the systemic risk of the real estate market, the credit
ratings of the CDOs were still high.72 Because CDOs were sold with a AAA
rating, institutional investors bought up these instruments.73 When the
housing industry declined sharply in 2007, these CDOs became virtually
worthless and created systemic losses throughout the financial system.74
66 Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIE INC. (Mar. 17, 2008),
htt://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html.
Cf FIN. INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 30, at xxiv, 50 (CDS were innovative because they
allowed banks and other mortgage lenders to securitize mortgages and sell them off to others,
thus hedging against the risks and making themselves less risky).
6 Id.
69 Morrissey, supra note 66.
70 See FIN. INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 30, at xxiv-xxv, 8 (CDOs were mortgage
securities that were packaged together based on their riskiness in order to minimize risk
through diversification).
71 Gretchen Morgenson, The Reckoning: How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/business/09magic.html?pagewanted
=all; Int'l Swaps and Derivatives Ass'n [ISDA], AIG and Credit Default Swaps (Nov. 2009),
http://www.isda.org/c and a/pdfISDA-AIGandCDS.pdf; William Selway, Jefferson County's
Path From Scandal to Bankruptcy: Timeline, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.bloomber
g.com/document/LUFIYM1A74E9.
72 Steven McNamara, Financial Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument for
Central Counterparty Clearing of the OTC Derivatives, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 209, 233-35 (2014).
73 Mark Riddix, Down the Rabbit Hole: Deciphering CDOs, FORBES (May 17, 2010), http://
www.forbes.com/2010/05/17/what-are-collateralized-debt-obligations-personal-finance-cdos.
html.
74 Cf McNamara, supra note 72, at 227-28.
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Well-known financial and insurance institutions such as Lehman Brothers,
Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch and AIG were some of the hardest hit institutions
during 2008 because of their part in buying and selling CDOs; they held
many bad assets, which ultimately led to bankruptcies, mergers, and
bailouts.75
After the initial shock of the 2008 financial crisis, many people sought
answers about why it took place. The opacity surrounding the formation of
these contracts and the mindset of deregulation during the late 1990s and
early 2000s had led many derivatives, mostly OTC derivatives, to be outside
of regulatory control in 2008. As more information became available to the
public, many public officials and regulators called for reform by the
legislature and agencies alike to stiffen the rules and regulations surrounding
these complex financial instruments.
However, many investors and financial institutions pushed back on the
idea of having stiffer regulation because of the important functions that
derivatives serve when used properly.7 7 Two main benefits of derivative
contracts are: allowing for investors to hedge the risks of investments and
allowing free-market trading on speculation. Permitting an investor to pass
risk along to a person who is in a better position to handle the risk by way of
a derivative contract is beneficial to the financial system because it places
risk on those who can bear it, while allowing the initial investor to benefit
from making the investment in the first place. Some view this passing of
risk onto the best risk-bearer as a financially sound practice, and thus a safe
practice. A free market approach to allowing speculation trading is
beneficial in that it places more money in the market and allows investors
who have the assets and the proper risk-profile to take speculative positions
in order to make big gains.
7 Baker, supra note 42, at 1307.
76 COMMODITIES FuTUREs TRADING COMM'N, Remarks of Gary Gensler, OTC Derivatives
Reform, Chatham House, London, Mar. 18, 2010, http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesT
estimony/opagensler-35 (discussing the need for "comprehensive and international"
regulatory reform in the OTC derivatives market); Alice M. Rivlin, The Fed's Money Well
Spent, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2008), http://www.nytines.com/2008/04/11/opinion/11rivin.htm
1?_r (discussing the rescue of Bear Steams and likening derivatives trading to Las Vegas
gambling).
n Jonathan Weisman & Eric Lipton, In New Congress, Wall St. Pushes to Undermine Dodd-
Frank Reform, N.Y. TIES (Jan. 13. 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/business/econo
my/in-new-congress-wall-st-pushes-to-undermine-dodd-frank-reform.html (investment firms
have spent over a hundred million dollars in successful lobbying attempts to limit the scope of
Dodd-Frank after its implementation).
78 Baker, supra note 42, at 1302.
7 Ren6 M. Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, 18 J. EcoN. PERSP. 173, 180 (2004), http://
fisher.osu.edu/supplements/1 0/10402/Should-We-Fear-Derivatives.pdf.
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From a regulator's view, the threat of regulatory arbitrage causes many
countries to shy away from stiffening regulations potentially resulting in an
exodus of financial institutions out of the stiffer jurisdictions into more lax
ones. However, like with financial/price arbitrage, there can be a benefit to
the short-term risks and costs of regulatory arbitrage. In financial arbitrage
situations, traders seek to purchase assets that are priced differently, even
though they are valued at the same amount, thus profiting off the later
convergence in price in a "riskless manner."80 It is possible for regulators to
adjust the regulatory schemes to create a more efficient market, minimizing
the risk of regulatory arbitrage. However, adjusting regulatory schemes to
promote harmony and consistency might lead to more lax regulations and
foster a "race-to-the-bottom" mentality for regulators, since the least
regulated jurisdiction will likely entice financial institutions to set up their
derivative practices within their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, concentrated
derivative practices within these lax jurisdictions exponentially increases the
chance of systemic market failure because that jurisdiction's economic
market will be subject to large economic swings based on the derivatives
marketplace.
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
The need for transparency in the OTC derivative marketplace is pivotal to
global financial stability. CDSs and CDOs, two of the leading causes of the
2008 financial crisis, are considered over-the-counter derivatives and were
left unregulated leading up to the financial crisis.81  Because of them, the
global markets are still recovering from the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression.8 2 Dodd-Frank, the main legislative response in the United
States, provided much needed regulatory oversight in the exchange-traded
and over-the-counter derivative markets.83 Since the crisis, the European
Union similarly increased its regulations over derivatives. With the United
States and the European Union housing the three main derivatives
marketplaces: New York, Chicago, and London, the regulatory changes were
expected." However, a question remains as to how other global players will
respond. To date, countries such as China, India, and other
8 See id.
81 CDOs and CDSs were unregulated until the implementation of 7 U.S.C.A. § 2.82 Nicholas W. Turner, Dodd-Frank and International Regulatory Convergence: The Case
for Mutual Recognition, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 391, 402 (2012-2013).83 FIRST DATA, supra note 3.
84 Cf DEUTSCHE BORSE GRoup, THE GLOBAL DERIVATIVE MARKET: AN INTRODUCTION 12-13,
http://www.math.nyu.edu/faculty/avellane/globalderivatives market.pdf (stating that England is
the largest market for derivatives, but that the U.S. had the most power in this market until
1990s).
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developed/developing countries have not made changes to their OTC
derivative regulations.
A. G20 Commitment
In response to the financial crisis in November of 2008, the Group of
Twenty's Financial Stability Board made a declaration that its member
countries would work together to enhance and restore the global financial
system. 6 In their report, the G20 committee outlined the general principles
that it believed could help promote a more stable global market in finance.
Their goals are to: (1) strengthen transparency and accountability, (2)
enhance sound regulatory practices through innovative regulatory
approaches, risk management and increased oversight, (3) promote integrity
in the financial markets, (4) reinforce international cooperation, and (5)
reform international financial institutions." The G20's commitment to
transparency and accountability is one of the G20s most cited principles.
Legislatures such as the United States, the European Union, Japan and
Australia have implemented laws in furtherance of these goals and have
committed themselves to widespread dissemination of information of OTC
derivative contracts, specifically through trade repositories.89
B. United States'Response to the G20 Commitment
In the United States, the legislature enacted Dodd-Frank in 2010 as a
means of combatting some of the problems which lead to the financial
crisis.90 In Title VII of this Act, the legislature sought to enact more
oversight over the OTC derivative marketplace. Title VH implemented a
clearinghouse requirement for certain types of swaps and imposed a
85 See Baker, supra note 42, at 1301.
86 Group of Twenty, supra note 1, at 416.
8 Id. at 417 (the principles to be implemented are: Increased Accountability &
Transparency, Enhancing Sound Regulation, Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets,
Reinforcing International Cooperation, Reforming International Financial Institutions).
88 Id. at 419-23 (outlining the general goals and processes for implementation that the G20
Committee believed to be most important to remedy the issues that caused the financial crisis
and to protect from other foreseeable future issues).
89 See generally 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(13)(G) (West 2015); Commission Regulation 2015/1515,
2015 O.J. (L 239) 63 (EU); CORPORATIONS AMENDMENT (CENTRAL CLEARING AND SINGLE-
SIDED REPORTING) REGULATION 2015, http://www.treasury.gov.au/-/media/Treasury/Consultati
ons%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2015/OTC%20derivatives/Key/o20Documents/PDF/OT
C derivatives Exposure draft.ashx; Ida Nordenstr6m, Mandating Central Counterparty Clearing
of OTC Derivatives: Extraterritorial Provisions and Cross-Border Solutions, G6tebogs
Universitet at 36, n.98 (2012), https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/31832/l/gupea20773183
2 1.pdf
_ 7 U.S.C.A. § 2.
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registration requirement for dealers and large-scale participants in the OTC
marketplace.91 The legislature put the SEC and the CFTC in control of
implementing these requirements and tasked them with creating other rules
in furtherance of the objectives of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.92 These
laws focused on reporting the OTC derivative contracts to trade
93
repositories.
1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Derivatives Regulation
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was given power over all
securities-based swaps.94 These securities-based swaps include credit default
swaps consisting of mortgaged-backed securities. In furtherance of Dodd-
Frank's rulemaking power, the SEC created a rule to enforce the reporting of
derivative contracts to trade repositories. The SEC was also tasked with
the job of overseeing private central counterparties (CCP). 9 6 These CCPs
were required to set marginal requirements and other processes in order to
minimize the risks that OTC derivatives place on the global economy.97 SEC
Commissioner Elisse Walter believed that the reporting of these derivative
contracts was necessary to abide by the United States' commitment to the
G20, since reporting increased the amount of transparency and the
monitoring ability of financial regulators.98
Since Illustration 2, discussed above, falls under SEC jurisdiction, it
would be subject to SEC regulatory rules.99 The SEC created marginal
requirements under what the parties have to hold a certain percentage of the
underlying assets.100 For example, in Illustration 2, Alfa Financial might be
required to hold a percentage of their holding in the underlying mortgage-
backed security. Because the SEC creates higher minimum requirements
91 Id. § 2(a)(13)(G).
92 Id
' 17 C.F.R. § 240.13n-1 (2015).
94 Id. § 240.13n-1(b).
9 Regulation SBSR-Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information,
17 C.F.R. § 242 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/34-74244.pdf.
96 Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, Testimony Concerning Regulation of Over-The-Counter
Derivatives at the U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, (June 22, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/
testimony/2009/ts062209mls.htm.
97 Collard, supra note 35, at 898.
9 Chairman Elisse Walter, REGULATION OF CROSS-BORDER OTC DERIVATIVE ACTIVITIES:
FINDING THE MIDDLE GROUND, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/News/Spe
ech/Detail/Speech/1365171515202.
99 See Illustration 2 on pp. 416 for the relevant facts.
10 Fact Sheet: Proposing Rules Governing Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements
for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N (July 29, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171586
085.
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than most other countries, institutions cannot enter into these interest rate
swaps to hedge against all the risk from the underlying loan. This
requirement effectively minimizes the risk of another party taking on all the
risk from the underlying asset, thus allowing institutions to sell away the risk
they created. This risk shifting that was prevalent with CDSs and other
mortgage-related securities. During the financial crisis, financial institutions
generated risky mortgages and then effectively sold away all that risk.
Dodd-Frank and the ensuing SEC regulations are meant to protect against
that by forcing banks to hold a piece of the risk that they created through
subprime loans.
2. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Rules
In response to Dodd-Frank's prodding and the G20 commitment, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has taken some different
approaches to using its regulatory power than have other regulators. Because
the CFTC deals with futures of commodities (e.g., grain, minerals, oil, and
gold) it has set a minimum block level that will trigger reporting to the trade
repositories. 101 A hypothetical example of this would be requiring parties to
report a futures contract dealing with 1,000 or more metric tons of copper.102
However, the CFTC has implemented much of the same reporting program
that the SEC has applied through its implementation of swap transaction
reporting. 10 3  The responsibility for reporting depends on the type of
transaction, but derivative contract parties are allowed to contract with third
parties to report the OTC derivative contract on their behalf.10 This
essentially gives the parties the ability to work with each other through a
CCP. The CFTC rules take into account the need for anonymity when
disseminating price and product transparency.10 5 The CFTC allows general
information to be disseminated so that financial institutions and agencies
101 See generally Procedures to Establish Appropriate Minimum Block Sizes for Large
Notional Off-Facility Swaps and Block Trades, 78 C.F.R. 32866 (2016).
102 This hypothetical was picked solely to relate to Illustration 1.
103 INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS'N, DODD FRANK AcT- SWAP TRANSACTION REPORTING
PARTY REQUIREMENTS (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www2.isda.org/attachment/NzUyOA=/CFTC/%
20Reporting/o20Party/20Requirements%20updated%20%20Apr/o202%202015_FINALDRA
FT clean.pdf.
'" Id.; see generally 17 C.F.R. Parts 43, 45 (2012) (codifying the CFTC reporting
obligations for Swap contracts between non-swap dealers and major swap participants, non-
swap dealers and non-swap dealers, or major swap participants and other major swap
participants).
"05 Annette L. Nazareth & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, Swap Reporting: Who and When?, FUTURES
INDus. 50 (Mar. 2013), http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/files/Publication/aad5de 6b-
ea2d-49c8-886e-Od7O739b39dd/Preview/PublicationAttachment/06a494e8-f2d6-4fb2-a6f3-la7
a3b4307ad/030113.Swap.Reporting.pdf.
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have access to data that will allow them to monitor the market for systemic
issues while still protecting party identities.
Under the CFTC reporting system and the hypothetical minimum block
requirement set out above, the Illustration 1 forward contract would need to
be reported to a CCP because the contract between Manufacturer A and
Mining Company B was for 1,000 metric tons of copper. 106 The CCP would
broker the deal between the two parties. Manufacturer A would give the
CCP $6 million. The CCP would then take the money and give it to Mining
Company B in exchange for the 1,000 metric tons of copper. The CCP
would then, in effect, give the copper to Manufacturer A. The goal of the
brokerage deal is to effectively enforce the regulatory framework on this
contract and to allow for better market transparency. The data collected by
the CCP would be made publically available, allowing other parties dealing
in copper to see the market price for 1,000 metric tons of copper and make
deals based on fair market value.
C. European Union's Response to the G20 Commitment
The European Union also enacted legislation in response to the G20's
commitment to creating more financial stability within its borders.o7 In
August of 2012, the European Union enacted EMIR, which had the sole
purpose of increasing transparency in the OTC derivatives marketplace.108
The key provisions implemented under EMIR were to report OTC derivative
contracts to trade repositories and to create central counterparties
requirements and other clearing requirements. 109 Under provisions to report
OTC contracts to trade repositories, the EMIR created a uniform data
reporting system and set the requirements for which contracts needed to be
reported and, if reportable, what information needed to be reported to the
trade repositories.' 10
D. Private Global Regulatory Oversight
In the 1980s, the IOSCO was formed in order to allow regulators around
the world a chance to come together and develop goals and standards for
member jurisdictions to follow.' These standards have been uniformly
106 See supra Illustration 1.
107 Commission Regulation 2015/1515, 2015 O.J. (L 239) 63 (EU).
1os See Commission Regulation 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (EU).
109 Id.
110 Id.
' About IOSCO, INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, Sept. 30, 2015, https://www.iosco.org/abo
ut/?subsection=about iosco.
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endorsed by the G20 as the international standard in securities.1 12 As of
2014, the IOSCO had 95% of the global jurisdictions in its membership.1 13
The IOSCO and member jurisdictions believe that financial policy should be
made together in order to set standards that prevent systemic financial risk at
a global scale, to protect investors, and to foster the financial market growth
throughout the world.1 14 In furtherance of this commitment, the IOSCO
announced a plan on August 19, 2015, that would implement Unique
Transaction Identifiers on OTC derivative contracts in all member
jurisdictions. 15
IV. A SIMPLIFIED DISCUSSION OF UNIQUE TRANSACTION IDENTIFIERS
A. What are Unique Transaction Identifiers?
Unique Transaction Identifiers are data tags that are given to OTC
derivatives in order for trade repositories to be able to aggregate data in
furtherance of the G20's commitment to "improve transparency, mitigate
systemic risk and protect against market abuse." 1 6  The IOSCO chose
Unique Transaction Identifiers as the ideal vehicle to satisfy the G20's
reformation plan because this tool would allow trade repositories to have a
consistent data form to take in data and would also permit for jurisdictions
throughout the world to be able to understand the OTC derivative
contracts. 117  Some of the G20 member countries have enacted and are
currently using their own versions of the Unique Transaction Identifiers,
which allows for a smooth transition into the transaction data-reporting
program. 118
In the plan and proposals listed by the IOSCO and the ISDA, Unique
Transaction Identifiers will consist of (1) a Unique Transaction Identifier
prefix (Prefix) identifying the party generating the transaction identifier and
112 d
113 Id. (consisting of only 75% of emerging markets; this becomes an issue when facing
challenges with financial arbitrage and "rogue" countries making very loose financial policy).
114 id.
115 Jones, supra note 16.
116 BANK FOR INT'L SETITLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, supra note 19, at 1 (listing
characteristics of the Unique Transaction Identifiers as: Neutrality, Uniqueness, Consistency,
Persistence, Traceability, Clarity, Easy and timely generation, Respecting existing UTIs,
Scope and flexibility, Representation, Long-Term viability, and Anonymity).
117 Id.
1' FiN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 12, at 12 (listing these member countries as: Australia,
Brazil, China, EU, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland and the United States).
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(2) a transaction identifier.' 19 The Prefix will consist of ten characters
unique to both future Unique Transaction Identifier prefixes as well as those
already existing in a few jurisdictions (known as LEls).1 2 0 Each financial
institution dealing in derivatives will be given its own Unique Transaction
Identifier prefix. The transaction identifier will consist of a maximum of
thirty-two characters. 12 1 Since some jurisdictions have already implemented
their own transaction identifier processes, the IOSCO has chosen to respect
the preexisting derivative contracts and will not require the institutions to
report an existing transaction in the new Unique Transaction Identifier
format. 12 2 The IOSCO will only require uniformity with the tagging scheme
when there is a new transaction. 12 3
If either the Illustration 1 or Illustration 2 contract were entered into under
this scheme, it would be given a maximum of thirty-two-character
identification. 12 4 Both parties would have unique ten-character prefixes for
their companies to make the contract recognizable to regulators. The
contract information would then be stored by trade repositories, which would
provide the information freely to regulators. Since all contracts would be
documented, regulators would be able to use this information to see overall
trends in the market. If this process were available during the financial
crisis, the systemic issues with CDS and CDOs would have likely been
noticed and mitigated properly by regulators.
B. Purpose of Unique Transaction Identifiers
The idea is that these transaction identifiers will allow institutions to
either report the data on their own or send it to a transaction repository that
will store the data for any of the IOSCO member jurisdictions.1 2 5  The
IOSCO and CPMI plan states that Unique Transaction Identifiers will allow
for better market transparency and give regulators more information, and
therefore more opportunity, to hedge against systemic risk like the CDOs and
CDSs that posed such dangers in 2008.126 They believe that adopting a
119 INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVE Ass'N, UNIQUE TRANSACTION IDENTIFIER (UTI):
GENERATION, COMMUNICATION AND MATCHING, Section 4.3 UTI Construct, 7-10 (July 20,
2015), http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/technology-infrastructure/data-and-reporting/ident
ifiers/uti-usi/.
120 Id at 7.
121 Idat9.
122 INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Ass'N, Re: Harmonisation of the Unique Transaction
Identifier- Consultative Report (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NzkxMA
=/CPMI-IOSCO_UTI ResponseSep%2030%202015_FINAL.pdf.
123 Id. at 19.
124 See supra Illustrations 1, 2.
125 See INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Ass'N, Section 5.1 Electronic Execution, pp. 11-13.
126 See Jones, supra note 16.
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uniform tagging system will provide the transparency the G20 sought, while
allowing for collaboration and uniformity throughout the member
jurisdictions by creating a uniform process by which members can read and
transmit derivative contract information to the trade repositories.1 2 7
However, IOSCO's transaction identifiers are of greater complexity than
one would think at first glance. OTC derivatives are defined differently
globally, and current reporting within the different jurisdictions varies
widely. 12 8 For example, the European Union and the United States require
transactions to be reported only on the buy side (single-side reporting),
though they decide who reports the OTC derivative contract differently.1 2 9
On the other end of the spectrum, Australia requires some entities to report
both sides of the transaction through a process called "double-side
reporting."1 30 Both the purchaser and the seller are required to report the
trade.
All of these jurisdictions created their reporting programs in furtherance
of the G20 commitment to reform the derivative marketplace, but their
unique approaches to transaction reporting have actually harmed
transparency and collaboration. The G20's reformation plan sought to
produce better market transparency by hedging against systemic risk and
preventing market manipulation.1 3 1  However, when jurisdictions enacted
their own reporting programs with little to no uniformity in their reporting
processes, the markets became even more opaque. Differing reporting plans
hinder market transparency. Prior to the announced Unique Transaction
Identifier Scheme, the IOSCO has left this issue largely untouched but has
encouraged its member jurisdictions to work together through substituted
compliance to determine which jurisdiction's law applies.3 2 Substituted
compliance is a doctrine where "international financial institutions with U.S.
127 INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVEs Ass'N, supra note 103 (IOSCO members account for 95%
of the countries worldwide).
128 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, supra note 19, at 3
(outlining several complex issues that the IOSCO and regulators will face when implementing
UTIs).
129 15 U.S.C.A. § 8302 (a)(l)-{2) (2010) (transferring the rulemaking ability to both the SEC
and the CFTC); 17 C.F.R. § 45.9 (2012); Questions and Answers: Implementation of the
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade
Repositories (EMIR), EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKETS AUTHORITY (ESMA), at 92 (Feb. 4,
2016), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2016 242 qa xv on emir imple
mentation.pdf (giving the duty to report to the party with whom "the risk lies once the contract
has been concluded").
130 See CORPORATIONS AMENDMENT, supra note 89 (amending the 2013 rule for double-
sided reporting for all OTC derivatives, and allowing some limited entities to participate in
sinfle-sided reporting for OTC derivative contracts).
1 3 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, supra note 19, at 1.
132 See id. at 2.
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operations could be deemed in compliance with U.S. law and regulations by
complying with their host country's regulations, provided that the
regulations ... are 'equivalent' to their U.S. counterparts."l33 The IOSCO
believes that allowing for a substituted compliance regime allows countries
to maintain their own uniqueness in the reporting process while reducing the
complexity and inefficiency of reporting derivative contracts.
C. Current State of OTC Derivative Reporting and the Plans to Implement
Unique Transaction Identifiers
In 2009, the G20 members agreed to require increased transparency for
OTC derivative contracts sold within their jurisdictions. 13 4 Currently, a few
countries use their own transaction identifier to report data to trade
repositories as made pursuant to the G20 meeting. 13 5 However, since the
implementation is both new and different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
the IOSCO has sought to implement the Unique Transaction Identifiers to
help facilitate uniformity within the global marketplace. Having uniformity
will allow regulators to pursue their regulatory goals more efficiently
because of the increase in transparency. The IOSCO is working to finalize
the implementation of the IOSCO transaction identifiers by 2016.136 The
IOSCO and ISDA are encouraging countries to coordinate their
implementation dates to create a more efficient transitioning period. 13 7 They
praised Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore for aligning their
implementation dates to improve reporting consistencies, saying that
"inconsistent national implementation of global recommendations would be
inefficient, challenging and could undermine the availability of a globally
consistent transaction identifier for each derivative transaction." 13 8
V. ANALYSIS OF THE IOSCO'S UNIQUE TRANSACTION IDENTIFIER PLAN
There has been much controversy since the financial crisis about whether
there needs to be a uniform global regulatory scheme for the derivative
marketplace. Regulators often complain that the lack of data in the OTC
derivative marketplace has led to systemic risk due to their complexity and
133 Lily D. Vo, Comment, Substituted Compliance: An Alternative To National Treatment
For Cross-Border Transactions and International Financial Entities, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 85, 88 (2015).
134 See Group of Twenty, supra note 1.
135 See 17 C.F.R. § 45.5 (2016); EMTR Trade Reporting Service, NASDAQ-OMX (2017),
h7://www.nasdaqomx.com/transactions/Posttrade/clearing/europeanclearing/TR-reporting.
,6Jones, supra note 16.
137 INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Ass'N, supra note 122, at 5.
138 Id.
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speculative nature.1 39 Because of this overarching issue, most international
financial regulatory reform has focused on requiring mandatory clearing of
OTC derivative contracts. 14 0 The IOSCO's Unique Transaction Identifier
scheme is no exception; it creates a uniform way of tagging OTC derivative
contracts so that they can be cleared and compiled in trade repositories.1 4 1
However, the adequacy of this scheme will be scrutinized moving forward.
The ever-present issue of financial arbitrage looms over this dispute since the
compilation of data allows regulators in IOSCO member countries to have
access to a vast amount of information on OTC derivative contracts entered
into around the world. Thus, even though the information relating to the
contracts presents benefits to regulators and market pricing, there are many
opportunities to harm the financial marketplace at a macro level. Also,
added transparency in the global marketplace may allow institutions ample
opportunity to effectively choose their regulator and may also provide a
higher risk of regulators taking advantage of the member-repository data for
institutions within their jurisdictions. Here, regulators are considered
"captured" by corporations or institutions within their jurisdiction through
either financial or political manipulation.
However, assuming regulators are doing their job, the added transparency
provides them more opportunity to monitor the OTC marketplace and
specifically watch for indicators of another financial crisis and member
regulatory arbitrage.1 42 Also, with transparency comes fairer pricing, since
more information allows for a more accurate measure of the risk of the
derivative contract to be taken into account when considering pricing.1 4 3
Once pricing becomes more uniform, there is less opportunity for investors
or institutions to take advantage of price difference, creating a more efficient
market under modern economic theory.'" These benefits will adequately
outweigh the potential risk of arbitrage and will create both fairer pricing and
better monitoring of the marketplace as a whole.
139 Baker, supra note 42, at 1326-28 (stating that the chief "problem facing markets today is
information...").
14o Griffith, supra note 20, at 1292 (clearing processes are focused on compiling and
processing information so that regulators have the opportunity to effectively monitory the
financial marketplace for OTC derivatives).
141 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, supra note 19, at 1.
142 id.
143 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It's
Still a Matter oflnformation Costs, 100 VA. L. REv. 313, 317 (2014).
14 Cf id. ("In perfect markets---ones in which all information relevant to determining a
security's fundamental value is publicly available and the mechanisms by which that
information comes to be reflected in the securities market price operate without friction-
fundamental and informational efficiency coincide.").
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A. The Economic Effect of Information on the OTC Derivative Market
Under economic theory, more information regarding derivative contracts
worldwide will provide for more efficient pricing, thus a more efficient
market. 145 However, as more information is provided to investors,
speculative trading ceases to be as profitable. Derivatives gain their value
from future variance. Since many developed countries have moved to
requiring that more information be released to investors under Dodd-Frank
and EMIR, some institutions may see increased knowledge and stiffer
regulation as damaging to their derivatives portfolios' profitability. Also,
more information will typically create a stable price, along with the rising
capital requirements in the United States and in the EU.14
However, increased information may have a negative effect on particular
jurisdictions that have more stringent regulations. If an institution can enter
into the same contract in another, less-regulated jurisdiction, why would they
establish their derivatives practices in a stiffer regulatory jurisdiction with
higher capital requirements? Both of these factors may lead to an exodus of
financial institutions from the United States and the EU markets into lesser-
regulated jurisdictions. With these institutions moving their OTC derivatives
operations to other jurisdictions, the power of the European and United
States' markets could diminish.1 47
Unique Transaction Identifiers will allow regulators and institutions alike
to have a better view of the market. Since all OTC derivatives will have to
be reported to trade repositories using unique identifiers, the "market price"
will be more readily identifiable. 148  Therefore, under economic theory,
prices being available to all parties involved should allow for better decision-
making and cut down on pricing inefficiencies and arbitrage opportunities.
This is readily apparent in Illustration 1.149 With the Unique Transaction
Identifier system in place, if Manufacturer A entered into another forward
contract with Copper Mining Company C-after he made the copper forward
contract with Copper Mining Company B-he would have a better
145 Cf Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. (PAPERS & PRoc.) 383, 383-84, 387-88 (1970), http://www.e-m-h.org/Fama70.pdf.
146 Cf id. at 383-84, 387-88 (providing information gives regulators a better opportunity to
ascertain the risks of a particular OTC derivative instrument, or in a particular market. The
regulators will raise the capital requirements on riskier financial instruments directly because
of the risk they bear.).
147 The notion that the power of Europe and the United States may diminish as an effect of
regulatory arbitrage comes from the fact that they hold a majority of the G20 membership, and
the also currently contain the two largest OTC derivatives markets in the world.1 Cf BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, supra note 19, at 1
(increasing transparency will directly lead to better market price visibility).
149 See supra Illustration 1.
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understanding of current market price than Company C. If Company C has
no basis to determine what a good forward contract would be, Manufacturer
A could negotiate in such a way to lower the price beyond is the current
"market value" (the contract value from the first initial forward contract laid
out in Illustration 1). However, if the contract is readily known to Company
C through the Unique Transaction Identifier system, even if Company C
does not know that Manufacturer A was the party in the first forward
contract, he would still be in a better position to negotiate and seek a higher
price for his copper goods.
B. Regulatory Arbitrage: Cause and Effect
1. Cause
"Regulatory arbitrage will only exist to the extent that there is a
difference between the level of [one country's] regulation and that of other
jurisdictions. 1 s0 The difference of regulatory strength is important in the
OTC derivative marketplace because the benefits of lesser regulation may
draw financial institutions to perform their derivatives practices outside the
reach of U.S. regulators. Many of the current opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage have come about because of the increased requirements in both the
United States and the EU."' For example, the Dodd-Frank Act, through the
SEC and the CFTC, implemented higher marginal requirements for OTC
derivatives.1 52 If an institution does not wish to abide by the higher marginal
requirements, they can establish their derivatives practices in another
jurisdiction. 153  The SEC sought to minimize this risk by implementing
regulations assigning themselves the power to regulate any contract as long
as a U.S. entity is party to it. 154 In effect, U.S. institutions will be at a
competitive disadvantage to their foreign counterparties and may be enticed
to leave the United States for more profitable opportunities. Other
jurisdictions will be happy to take in these institutions and their derivative
practices because of the economic increase that financial institution can bring
150 Johnson, supra note 13, at 565 (stating that regulatory arbitrage exists because the
difference of law allows an institution to take advantage of a less-regulated system, in light of
stiffer regulations in another jurisdiction).
151 This regulation comes via the Dodd-Frank Act and the EMIR respectively.
152 Benjamin Weadon, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and Consumer Protection
Act: International Regulatory Arbitrage Resulting From Dodd-Frank Derivatives Regulation,
16 N.C. BANK. INST. 249, 265 (2012).
153 Cf id. at 267.
154 Id at 268 (discussing the possibility of foreign swap dealers from boycotting U.S. firms
because the U.S. marginal requirements are applied to all transactions in which the U.S.
company is a party).
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to their economy. Because no international laws currently force jurisdictions
to follow a uniform regulatory regime, regulatory arbitrage is, and always
will be, an issue unless fundamental changes towards a global regime are
made.
2. Effect
Regulatory arbitrage would, in effect, lessen the United States' force in
the financial marketplace and weaken the U.S. economy. Beyond the initial
benefits of financial arbitrage, the costs of complying with the requirements
of Dodd-Frank may also lead financial institutions, both foreign and
domestic, to decide that trading within the U.S. jurisdictional reach is simply
not worth the effort.15s For example, under Dodd-Frank, the U.S. has
implemented a stringent, collateral-based model for OTC derivative
contracts, whereas other jurisdictions require less collateral margin. 156 By
moving to a more liberal collateral requirement, financial institutions can
take more risk when in the derivative marketplace, allowing for higher
potential profit margins. Another effect of regulatory arbitrage is that it
would likely lead to a concentrated location of OTC derivative activity, thus
increasing the chance of systemic failure.1 57
C. Unique Transaction Identifiers' Effect on Arbitrage
The SEC believes that requiring OTC derivative contracts to be reported
to trade repositories mitigates the risk of financial arbitrage.' As of 2013,
90% of OTC derivative contracts were being voluntarily reported to trade
repositories.1 5 9 Even though they were reported, laws in foreign jurisdictions
did not provide all of the information needed to efficiently monitor the
market.160 The information being reported was incomplete due to the
differing laws on reporting requirements in the various jurisdictions.16 1 One
example of a difference in reporting is whether both the buy and sell side of
the OTC derivative should have been reported. 162 SEC Chairman Walter
155 See id. at 268-69 (noting that costs would include paying lawyers to understand the new
CFTC and SEC rules and reorganizing the business structure to comply with the new laws).
156 See Fact Sheet, supra note 100.
157 Weadon, supra note 152, at 259.
Iss Speech of Chairman Elisse Walter, supra note 98.
159 id
160 id.
161 See id.
162 See generally COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, supra note 76; ESMA, supra
note 129; Corporations Amendment, supra note 130.
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commented that filling this information gap is vital to the productivity of the
OTC derivative market.1 6 3
The tagging scheme proffered by the IOSCO will likely provide the
necessary vehicle to amass the information needed in the global OTC
derivative market. According to the IOSCO's report, the Harmonisation
Group has been tasked with guiding member jurisdictions through the
implementation process by deciding what contracts fall under the OTC
derivative definition.'" They have encouraged the creation and
implementation of a uniform set of standards for what should be reported to
the trade repositories. 16 5 Once the Harmonisation Group has determined
what the reporting standards should be for the transaction identifiers, the
information gap will likely be minimized, giving regulators like the SEC and
the CFTC the chance to monitor the markets more effectively. The Unique
Transaction Identifiers are not an attempt at a global regulatory scheme.
These identifiers will allow regulators and financial institutions throughout
the world to see derivative contracts being made and negotiate and price their
contracts according to the current market levels. The scheme will attempt to
accomplish this goal and provide for fairer prices and more regulatory
visibility to hedge against the risk of systemic failure.
1. IOSCO Non-Member Arbitrage
It is unlikely that financial institutions will move their practices overseas
because of the inherent risk found in non-IOSCO member markets.
According to a map of the IOSCO and the United Nations Country
Classification Study, the only countries that are non-members are "Least
Developing Countries," Developing Countries or economies in transition.166
The UN's study classifies countries based on their per capita gross national
income, voting by the UN General Assembly, human assets index, and
economic vulnerability index.1 67 Financial institutions flock to the major
developed countries because of the large financial assets available to be
traded and the diversity of business practices that institutions can invest in.
Adequate resources and diversity would likely not be available to the
financial institution if they moved their OTC derivatives practices to a non-
member jurisdiction.
163 Speech of Chairman Elisse Walter, supra note 98.
16 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, supra note 19, at 2.
165 Id
166 INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, IOSCO Membership Map, https://www.iosco.org/about/?sub
section=membership map (referenced a world map to pull the names of non-member
jurisdictions). Cf United Nations, Statistical Annex: Country Classification, http://www.un.org/
en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2013counftyclass.pdf.
167 id
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It can also be argued that the financial institution could still partake in
developed countries' markets without being subject to the more stringent
rules. However, the SEC and the CFTC, pursuant to Dodd-Frank Article
VII, have implemented a rule which requires their regulations be applied to
cross-border activities.'68  This would apply U.S. law to some OTC
derivatives contracts even if a financial institution were incorporated in a
non-member jurisdiction, so long as that institution is making a derivatives
contract with a U.S. entity.'69  The inevitably of these types of contracts
creates a conflict of law. A financial institution could hypothetically create
intrastate OTC derivative contracts within the non-member jurisdiction, but
there is no incentive to do this. It would exponentially increase the risk of
systemic failure for a very limited gain.
2. IOSCO Member Arbitrage
To be clear, the IOSCO's derivative tagging system does not force a
member country to implement certain international regimes of financial
regulations,1 7 0 but it does give regulators better visibility within the markets
for early warning signs.' 7 ' Also, most financial regulation is about
transparency; therefore, the tagging system gives regulators hard data on the
impact of their financial regulations on the OTC derivative markets
worldwide.1 7 2 With that data, legislatures and agencies can better allocate
their limited resources and more effectively oversee their jurisdictional
markets, as well as the global market as a whole. Furthermore, the clarity
168 See generally Barclays Capital, Extraterritorial Application of Title VII (Sept. 2011),
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission 09281
1_1067 0.pdf (outlining what regulations are extraterritorially applied); Robert L.D. Colby &
Andrew S. Fei, Potential Extraterritorial Application ofRegulations Issued Under Title VII of
the Dodd-Frank Act No. 6 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1 (2011).
169 Colby & Fei, supra note 168, at 2 (stating that Title VII of Dodd-Frank Section 722
places extraterritorial regulations on swaps that "(1) have a direct and significant connection
with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States or (2) contravene the rules and
regulations promulgated by the CFTC as necessary or appropriate to prevent evasion of the
Dodd-Frank Act").
170 Cf BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, supra note 19, at 7
(stating that the purpose of this report is to develop guidance for Unique Transaction
Identifiers).
17 It gives better visibility because of regulators ability to see all OTC derivative contracts
made, thus enabling them to discover if and where systemic risk is located.
172 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, What We do, June 10, 2015, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (stating that one of the goals of the SEC is to facilitate a "steady flow of
timely, comprehensive, and accurate information [so people can] make sound investment
decisions"); U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n, Mission & Responsibilities, http://
www.cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (stating that the "mission of the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is to foster open, transparent, competitive,
and financially sound markets. . .").
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provided by the Unique Transaction Identifiers will allow the parties
contracting with one another to better take into account the market price of
their products and to adjust accordingly for differences in regulations. In
effect, this may minimize the risky position U.S. institutions are in when
contracting with foreign jurisdictions due to the capital requirements.
Problems may arise when the private sector has the ability to read the
Unique Transaction Identifier codes. 173  With this information, the public
(ex. a private institution) can learn the Unique Transaction Identifier prefix
of other institutions, and will be able to read the contractual information.
The public has commented that the IOSCO should address the concerns
about institutions receiving and utilizing specific transaction information, by
keeping the Unique Transaction Identifiers anonymous. 17 4 However, this is a
problem when regulatory agencies and legislatures are "captured" by the
private sector. Regulatory capture by the private sector is a situation where
the regulator is regularly ?ersuaded by private entities to act passively in
their regulatory function.' 5 This is not done through bribery or illegal
means, but rather through influence and political clout.1 7 6 Since the agencies
would have access to this information, said agencies could give private
institutions information advantages in the marketplace. Currently other
private regulators, like the ISDA, do not view this as a relatively important
issue and have dismissed the idea of using dummy codes without any
significant identifying information in the code itself.' 7 7 They stated that,
We are not able to envision reasons why the UTI [Unique
Transaction Identifier] should carry trade elements which are
already reported in data fields provided to the TR [trade
repositories]. The role of the UTI has not been to communicate
or deliver a package of information . .. rather the role of the
UTI is to allow [sic] a transaction to be uniquely identified. 17 8
This leaves the system vulnerable to financial institutions, which have
captured a regulatory agency, taking advantage of their ability to see the
transactions made and use that information to their advantage.
Also, the Unique Transaction Identifier tagging scheme creates
opportunity for member regulators to compete with one another for the
173 See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, supra note 19, at 8.
174 INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS'N, supra note 122.
175 Cf Scott Hempling, "Regulatory Capture": Sources and Solutions, 1 EMORY CORP.
GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 24-25 (2014), http://1aw.emory.edu/ecgar/_document
s/volumes/l/1/hempling.pdf.
176 See id.
177 INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES AsS'N, supra note 122, at 41.
178 id
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derivatives practices of the large financial institutions. As mentioned above,
the tagging system does not force member jurisdictions to have more
stringent financial regulatory requirements apart from the reporting
system.1 79  Countries are still allowed to set their own capital requirements.
Therefore, the Unique Transaction Identifier reporting system may provide
member jurisdictions with the same transparency found in other member
jurisdictions, while still remaining lax in other areas of regulation. This may
incentivize financial institutions to move to a different member jurisdiction
with lower regulations, while still having the opportunity to receive the
repository data amassed by way of the Unique Transaction Identifiers.
Despite this, the risk of either regulatory capture or a regulatory "race-to-
the-bottom" is still outweighed by the transparency and oversight benefits of
the transaction reporting system. Both capture and race-to-the-bottom
scenarios exist apart from the Unique Transaction Identifier system. If
anything, the transaction identifier reporting will allow regulators around the
world to see the financial market more clearly and determine whether
regulations are having their intended effect on the market. The new scheme
was not created to enact private regulation, but rather it was meant to hedge
against risk by providing more transparency in the market. The scheme
satisfies that function.
Since the identifiers are anonymous, they will not give regulators or
institutions a leg up on competition because every member jurisdiction will
be provided a broad brush understanding of what is going on in the markets
to prevent systemic risk, not individualized risk. 80  If institutions are not
incentivized to participate in a particularly risky derivative market because of
the information they have received, then the transaction reporting system is
performing its intended function.
Even assuming member jurisdictions do compete for the OTC derivatives
practices within their jurisdiction, some jurisdictions may give their
regulations teeth by adding an extra-territorial clause to contracts made by an
institution outside its borders. Under Dodd-Frank Title VII, the marginal
requirements apply to swaps that have a "foreseeable substantial effect
within the United States." 18  The SEC and CFTC are encouraged to work
with foreign regulators to enforce the laws of both countries, especially if the
entity is substantially complying with the law.1 8 2  However, Dodd-Frank
179 cf BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS & INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'N, supra note 19, at 7.o80 Id. at 14 (the anonymity characteristic is a proposed characteristic not originally a part of
the Unique Transaction Identifiers. The IOSCO is considering implementing anonymity,
since without it, it would problematically disclose private information.).
"' Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, at 489 (2010).
182 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, SEC Adopts Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Rules
(June 25, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542163722.
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gives the SEC and the CFTC the power to extraterritorially bring foreign
institutions within the United States' jurisdictions, thus requiring a foreign
institution to comply with U.S. financial laws when an OTC derivative
contract has a substantial effect on the U.S. markets. 18 3 In effect, this law
would take away the incentive for a U.S. institution to move to another,
lesser-regulated jurisdiction if they wish to still contract with another U.S.
entity. In order for the race-to-the-bottom to effectively work, all the largest
financial institutions in the United States would have to move their
derivatives practices, and possibly all their financial practices, to another
jurisdiction so that the derivatives contracts would have no effect on the
United States market. This hypothetical situation is highly unlikely due to
the risk of systematic issues and should not have any effect on whether the
Unique Transaction Identifier reporting system will successfully reach its
goal of increased transparency in the derivative marketplace.
Illustration 2 helps put this issue into perspective.m Assume that Alfa
Corporation and Strong Financial are incorporated in the U.S. Strong
Financial may choose to deal with another corporation-Beta Corporation
from Canada, an IOSCO-member jurisdiction-because of the stringent
minimum requirements set forth by SEC regulations. However, under SEC
regulations, that OTC derivative contract may be extraterritorially brought
under SEC jurisdiction because a U.S. entity is a part of the transaction.
The situation differs if a party is not already currently a U.S.-incorporated
entity. Assume that Alfa Corporation is a U.S. entity, and Strong Financial is
a Canadian entity. Strong Financial may wish to deal with another
corporation outside of the United States so that the contract is not subject to
SEC minimum requirements rules. This puts Alfa Corporation at a
competitive disadvantage because of the more stringent regulations in the
United States. It is feasible that Alfa Corporation could move itself to a
more lax member jurisdiction and still take advantage of the transparency
that the Unique Transaction Identifiers bring to the OTC derivatives market.
However, if all financial institutions collectively move into these lesser-
regulated jurisdictions, then the market has set itself up for systemic failure.
There will be a concentration in the derivatives within a few jurisdictions,
which will cause massive issues if the markets take a downswing. Also,
because the United States is a major party in the financial markets, it may be
hard to completely shun U.S. institutions. Since the SEC has created
extraterritorial jurisdiction over any deals "relating to the U.S." or where a
183 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 172; Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n,
supra note 172.
See supra Illustration 2.
185 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 172.
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U.S. institution is a party, it would render the institution's choice to leave the
United States useless.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the most devastating financial crisis since the Great
Depression, regulators worldwide must provide some form of oversight over
the financial marketplace. The most crucial goal of such oversight is
providing market transparency within the realm of derivatives. Having OTC
derivatives reported to trade repositories by way of Unique Transaction
Identifiers allows for more information sharing between regulators and better
visibility of the market as a whole. This goal heavily outweighs the risk of
regulatory arbitrage because it allows regulators to have clarity and to be
able to understand the full effects of the regulations that they put over their
respective markets. However, many may see increased transparency as a
chance for less powerful jurisdictions to vie for financial institutions by
providing less regulatory oversight. They believe that this will create a
regulatory "race-to-the-bottom"; however, more visibility allows for higher-
quality regulation, targeted to the specific needs of the market without being
overbearing or excessive.
Many of the most powerful entities allow some extent of free market and
choice in pursuing risky enterprises with the opportunity for large gains.
Having this added risk in the derivative marketplace allows some entities to
take on riskier initiatives or investments because they intend to pass the risk
on to someone who is more willing and able to bear it. This concept has
been widely criticized since the financial crisis because it opened up many
large, and supposedly, high quality institutions to riskier holdings. Since
many of these derivative holdings were based on the real estate market,
institutions were left exposed to the risk of market failure within real estate.
The 2007 real estate market collapse came without warning, but regulators
and investors were blindsided even more so by the risky derivatives based
solely on this market. The G20 surmised that this risk could be better
controlled by added transparency within the financial markets, and they
specifically addressed the risk as it related to over-the-counter derivatives.
They believe that increasing transparency will, in fact, allow regulators to
have better control over the market since it will allow them to better
understand current market trends and the effect current regulations are
having on the market.
All of the G20 members are regulatory members of the IOSCO. They,
through the private commission, have concluded that Unique Transaction
Identifiers are the first step to providing transparency to the derivative
marketplace on a global scale. The transaction-reporting program is not the
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IOSCO's attempt at a global regulatory system, creating uniformity in
rulemaking, but rather is meant to be a tool for regulatory agencies and
member jurisdictions to better oversee their respective jurisdictions by
having an eye on the broad state of the global derivatives marketplace. The
Unique Transaction Identifier plan created by the IOSCO will require only
certain information to be reported to trade repositories. This information can
be freely accessed by regulated entities for whatever purpose they deem
necessary. Though this will most certainly create opportunity for regulatory
arbitrage, either through a race-to-the bottom or through regulatory capture,
there will be long-term benefits of transparency that far outweigh the
potential downside.
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